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THE IMPORTANCE OF CONSTITUTION-MAKING
DAVID LANDAU†
In this short invited contribution, I argue that scholars and policymakers need to shift focus from the moment at which the break with the
old regime occurs towards the moment at which new constitutional orders are constructed. The constitution-making process in countries like
Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya, for example, is likely to determine in large
measure what these new regimes are likely to look like. In particular, I
draw off of a case study of the 2009 military coup in Honduras, which
was provoked by ex-President Zelaya’s attempt to call a constituent assembly, to make two points. First, both constitutional theory and international law and politics have allowed constitution-making processes to
occur in a vacuum—neither provides any real restraints on these processes. Second, the main risk of constitution-making is that powerful
individuals or political parties use either real or manufactured majorities to impose constitutions on the rest of their societies. An urgent task
in constitutional design and theory is therefore to construct models that
will constrain this kind of constitution-making, and to find ways to enforce those constraints.
Recent events in the Middle East and elsewhere, as well as recent
scholarly contributions, have again pushed to the forefront questions of
revolutionary change and democratic transition. The events in Egypt and
elsewhere open up possibilities for democratization and for peaceful
change in parts of the world where this was previously thought unlikely.
But we must avoid idealizing these moments. Revolutions and constitution-making processes are often traumatic experiences, and transitions
from authoritarian regimes can often prove to be false ones, replacing
these regimes with new authoritarian or semi-authoritarian governments.1
The key question is thus the following: what determines the end
state of revolutions? What factors cause a revolution to end up in an ultimately democratic or nondemocratic outcome? Here, I think it is important to recognize that revolutions and other types of regime change2
† Assistant Professor of Law, Florida State University College of Law. I would like to thank
Noah Feldman, Will Partlett, Brian Sheppard, Fernando Teson, and Manuel Utset for conversations
about the ideas in this draft.
1. See generally STEVEN LEVITSKY & LUCAN A. WAY, COMPETITIVE AUTHORITARIANISM:
HYBRID REGIMES AFTER THE COLD WAR (2010); Andreas Schedler, The Logic of Electoral Authoritarianism, in ELECTORAL AUTHORITARIANISM: THE DYNAMICS OF UNFREE COMPETITION 1, 1
(Andreas Schedler ed., 2006) (arguing, among other things, that “[a] large number of political regimes in the contemporary world . . . have established the institutional facades of democracy”).
2. Note that I do not in this essay carefully distinguish revolutions from other types of regime changes, such as coups, because my point does not depend on how the event is categorized.
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are sequential events, with at least two major stages. In the first stage,
new power holders replace existing power holders in control of the government. For the kinds of events being considered here, this replacement
is usually done by extralegal means. From the standpoint of the existing
legal regime, the shift to a new government is done illegally and generally in flagrant violation of the existing legal order. In the second stage, the
new regime seeks to establish the rules under which it itself will be governed. This is the stage in which constitutions are written and new institutions created. In Egypt, for example, the first phase occurred when the
people took to the streets and forced the removal of Mubarak. The second stage is ongoing—the interim military government is still at work
planning the new constitution and preparing to hold the first set of elections.
We must pay more attention, both in scholarship and in international politics, to the second stage. In particular, we must be much more attuned to the process by which new institutions are constructed. Observers, diplomats, and international organizations often pay great attention
to the dramatic moment at which an existing regime falls; these actors
pay far less attention to the aftermath, when new institutions are constructed.
Similarly, international law has traditionally had nothing to say
about these situations, and scholarship in both comparative politics and
comparative constitutional law have both deemphasized the constitutionmaking process itself as an object of study. Traditional legal theory compounds the problem by viewing constitution-making as a kind of legal
black hole. Hans Kelsen’s theory of revolution, for example, holds that
revolution occurs precisely when there is a decisive legal break with the
old constitutional or legal order.3 Once such a break has occurred, the
state is in a kind of legal no-man’s land until the new constitutional order
has been constructed—there is no legal standard for evaluating the propriety of acts by the interim regime.
The manner in which the old regime collapses generally does not
determine how the process of constructing the new regime will turn out.
Instead, a revolution or coup generally leaves a chaotic jumble of emerging parties and civil society groups in its wake. The shape of the new
regime will be determined by how these groups interact and participate
to construct the basic institutions of the new regime. And thus it is the
second stage that is likely to govern the normative desirability of revolutions and other overthrows of existing regime—the key question is not
The broad point is that regardless of how a regime change occurs, we should be paying much more
attention to the attempt to construct a new regime.
3. See generally HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 117 (Anders
Wedberg trans., 1945).
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how the old regime was overthrown, but rather what the new regime
looks like. This process, then, is exactly where we should focus our energies as scholars. Yet, despite an outpouring of high quality recent
work, it is still undertheorized.4
Constitution-making holds great promise. Constitutional politics has
the potential to establish the legitimacy of a new democracy across a
broad spectrum of social groups. This sort of legitimacy is the foundation
of a vibrant democracy. But constitution-making is also dangerous and
commonly abused; constitution-making is often seized to impose the
agendas of particular social groups or, even worse, of particular actors
who are trying to consolidate power. Such processes are likely to lead to
poorly functioning and unstable states. Thus, an important but very difficult task is to devise ways to prevent this kind of abuse from occurring.
Rather than designing constitution-making in an attempt to reach some
idealized end state, we may be better served by developing a “risk
averse” model of constitutionalism, where the major goal is to prevent
democratic breakdown.
The rest of this response is organized as follows: In Part I, I lay out
the importance of my object of study, explaining why we should focus
on the constitution-making moment as the key to understanding the effects of revolutions, coups, and other methods of fundamental regime
change. In Part II, I explain the ways in which this area is a traditional
legal and constitutional theory, as well as international law, even when
fortified by some pro-democratic norms, pays no real attention to questions regarding the quality of democracy in existing regimes or to the
constitution-making processes. Part III gives an example of these problems in practice, drawing off of my own recent work as part of a team
analyzing the 2009 coup in Honduras. While the international community was fixated on the coup itself, it offered almost no responses to the
dangerous abuses of constitution-making that both preceded and followed it. The Honduran example is cautionary—it shows that constitution-making processes are often dangerous exercises.
Part IV jumps off from another observation based on the Honduran
case: the chief risk of constitution-making may be the risk that it will be
abused by powerful political actors or social groups for their own ends.
Put another way, the main risk of constitution-making seems to be that it
may be excessively majoritarian: politicians and social groups may manufacture momentary majorities, either real or invented, to remake the
state in their image. This kind of constitution-making does lasting dam4. For some examples of recent scholarship, see FRAMING THE STATE IN TIMES OF
TRANSITION: CASE STUDIES IN CONSTITUTION MAKING (Laurel E. Miller, ed., 2010); Ozan Varol,
The Democratic Coup d’Etat, 53 HARV. INT’L L.J. (forthcoming 2012); William Partlett, Making
Constitutions Matter The Dangers of Constitutional Politics in Current Post-Authoritarian Constitution Making, 38 BROOK. J. INT’L L. (forthcoming 2012).
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age to democratic institutions. Finally, Part V concludes by suggesting
that there is an urgent need to develop guidelines that will help to stop
this kind of constitution-making, and that will incorporate these ideas
into domestic and international politics. I do not here develop a complete
theory of constrained or risk-averse constitution-making; that is a task I
and other scholars have worked towards in other work.5 My goals here
are more modest: I point out the difficulty in achieving constraint in these moments, and the urgent need to do so.
I. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE CONSTITUTION-MAKING MOMENT
No account of a regime’s upheaval is complete without considering
what happens next, as coups and revolutions do not and cannot end at the
moment in which the old regime dies. The new regime needs to organize
itself in some fashion, by establishing fundamental rules. This is going to
be true regardless of which political and social groups hold power after
the coup or revolution. In the past, new authoritarian regimes might have
settled for organizing power with some form of provisional statutes or
other document short of a constitution. This would have permitted the
regime to establish working rules for dealing with intra-elite disputes,
while also giving flexibility.6 Recently, though, virtually all new governments have moved relatively quickly towards the establishment of
new constitutions. And even authoritarian regimes have generally
clothed these constitutions in democratic garb. As Levitsky and Way
have recently shown, there is now enough international pressure towards
democracy that even basically authoritarian regimes like Iran and the
more authoritarian post-Soviet states create some democratic institutions,
such as elections, within otherwise non-democratic states.7
Egypt poses a classic variant on the problem—opposition protests
resulted in the overthrow of the authoritarian regime headed by Mubarak
in February 2011. But this left the state with essentially no framework
for governance; the military therefore established a temporary regime,
quickly establishing a provisional constitution (based on amendments to
the old constitution) in March 2011 and promising to hold elections by
late 2011. The provisional constitution, which was drafted by the military
and approved via wide margins in a referendum, was never intended to

5. See David Landau, Constitution-Making Gone Wrong, 64 ALA. L. REV. (forthcoming
2012).
6. Even classical, personalized authoritarian regimes like Pinochet’s Chile in the 1970s
sought to impose some form of organizing principles, initially in the form of a Statute of the Junta,
and later a full-fledged Constitution. As Barros argued, these documents meant something—they
served to as checks on Pinochet’s power by other members of the junta. However, even this authoritarian regime eventually moved towards adopting a permanent constitution, which came into effect
in 1980. See generally ROBERT BARROS, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DICTATORSHIP: PINOCHET, THE
JUNTA, AND THE 1980 CONSTITUTION 167–254 (2002).
7. These regimes they refer to as “competitive authoritarian” states. See LEVITSKY & WAY,
supra note 1, at 1.
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be a permanent document.8 Instead, the interim regime established vague
plans for the creation of a new text sometime after the first set of elections were held.
Both the timing of elections and the process for writing the new
constitution have created tension among the various social groups in
Egypt. Islamist groups, led by the Muslim Brotherhood, have dominated
the initial elections for Parliament, and—after initially promising not to
run a candidate—captured the presidency.9 The military and its allies
(particularly the judiciary) have in various ways—some clumsy, others
more sophisticated—tried to limit the electoral power of Islamist groups.
The military’s initial attempts to impose a set of principles on the constitution-making process were met with widespread derision and renewed
protests,10 but the courts have subsequently had considerable success in
limiting the power of the Muslim Brotherhood. After the supreme administrative court suspended the constituent assembly appointed by the Parliament, the supreme constitutional court dissolved the Parliament itself,
holding that the electoral rules used to elect part of the legislature were
unconstitutional.11 What has emerged is a complex negotiation process
between forces, the outcome of which will determine the future of the
Egyptian state.
These conflicts show that the revolution did not in any sense end
with the overthrow of Mubarak. Nor will it be over when the first set of
elections are held, because the new Parliament will still lack a constitutional text or other principles to guide its work and to establish the basic
institutional framework for the country. Moreover, the fights staged
amongst the various political groups and between those groups and the
government are critical because they will shape the new constitution and
thus the basic character of the new regime. A constitution written by
Islamist groups like the Muslim Brotherhood working alone, or by the
military working alone, would look very different from the constitution
written by secular political groups or by all of the new groups working in
cooperation. This first set of parliamentary elections and the new constitution will define what the Egyptian revolution means.
8. Turnout at the referendum was 41.2%, and 77% of voters approved the constitutional
changes. Egypt Referendum Strongly Backs Constitution Changes, BBC NEWS,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-12801125 (last updated Mar. 20, 2011, 6:05 PM).
9. See Leila Fadel, Final Results Confirm Islamists Winners in Egypt’s Elections, WASH.
POST (Jan. 21, 2012), www.washingtonpost.com/world/.../gIQAXpwbGQ_story.html (stating that
the Freedom and Justice Party won 47% of seats in the lower house, and the conservative Islamist
Salafist Nour party won 25%).
10. These principles offered some guarantees of the liberal nature of the new democracy, but
also gave the military considerable autonomy and power over the new state. See Declaration of the
Fundamental Principles for the New Egyptian State, Draft Dated November 1, 2011 A Commentary
4 (International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2011).
11. See INTERNATIONAL FOUNDATION FOR ELECTORAL SYSTEMS, ELECTIONS IN EGYPT:
IMPLICATIONS OF RECENT COURT DECISIONS ON THE ELECTORAL FRAMEWORK 9–10 (2012), available
at
http://www.ifes.org/~/media/Files/Publications/White%20PaperReport/2012/
Egypt_SCC_Decisions_August9.pdf.
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And this is the normal course of affairs. There may be some cases
where one political and social group (i.e., the military) has so much power that it will make no difference what the electoral and constitutional
processes look like: the outcome is foreordained by the dominance of
that group.12 But this situation is highly unusual—in most recent situations involving regime change (for example, Venezuela after Chavez
came to power, Egypt, and now Libya) the situation is highly fluid, with
new social groups and political parties organizing and a variety of new
groups vying for control. No one faction has clear control in the new
regime. In these cases, the constitution-making process will indeed be
one of the key moments in shaping the character of the new regime. Yet,
as I show in Part II, these processes fall through important gaps in both
legal theory and in international law and politics.
II. THE SILENCE OF LEGAL THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
In this section, I explain why constitution-making moments constitute a kind of “wild-west” both in domestic constitutional theory and in
international law. Kelsenian theories of revolutionary break emphasize
that revolutions occur, legally, when the new regime makes a decisive
legal break with the old one. In other words, they occur when the old
constitution is expressly abrogated; its procedures and substantive constraints are thrown out. In practice, virtually all new constitution-making
occurs this way, because it is rare for an existing constitution to have a
provision allowing its own replacement by an entirely new text. But this
leaves a vacuum, because new constitutions are then written outside of
any set of domestic legal constraints. International norms do not fill that
vacuum; international law, even when concerned with the promotion and
maintenance of democracy, has not developed any clear rules about what
constitution-making must look like.
A. Domestic Constitutional Theory
Kelsen defines a revolution as an event that replaces the “entire legal order.”13 In other words, the constitution is altered or replaced by
some process other than the one contemplated in the text, and as result,
the old constitution and laws lose their efficacy. In practice, almost all
constitution-making follows this route. Very few constitutions allow for
the calling of a constituent assembly within their text, and thorough replacement of a constitutional text by means found within an existing
constitutional order is, ordinarily, likely to prove difficult or impossible.
12. Some classic authoritarian regimes, like Chile post-1973, might fit this model: the postauthoritarian regime was dominated by a small clique of military officials. But it is notable that even
in Chile, the military regime eventually moved towards writing a new constitution, which came into
effect in 1980. And as Barros shows, the final product was heavily influenced by the negotiations
between different factions of the military and by the involvement of commission’s composed of both
right-wing and centrist lawyers. See BARROS supra note 6, at 168.
13. See KELSEN, supra note 3, at 118.
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Constitutions, in other words, contemplate their amendment but almost
never their replacement. To take examples from recent Latin American
history, the Colombian Constitution of 1991, the Venezuelan Constitution of 1999, the Ecuadorian Constitution of 2008, and the Bolivian Constitution of 2009 all utilized constituent assemblies to replace their constitutional texts, and the use of a constituent assembly to replace the old
constitution was not mentioned in any of the old constitutions.
How, then, did these events occur? In some instances they are basically extralegal—courts simply refrain from passing on their legality ex
ante, or the assembly proceeds even in the face of a negative judicial
decision.14 In other cases, the court upholds the assembly, generally on
the grounds that there is a residual power in the people to make or unmake their constitutional order. In 1990, for example, the Colombian
Supreme Court held that the president could proceed with elections to
call a constituent assembly, essentially on the grounds that “the people
. . . is the primary constituency from which all constituted and derivative
powers emanate.”15 Thus, despite a constitution which stated only one
method of constitutional amendment (approval by an subabsolute majority of congress in two separate congressional sessions), the public always
has a residual power to call a constituent assembly to replace the existing
political order.
The consequences of both courses of events are the same—the constitution-making process is subject to no clear rules or constraints under
domestic law. In the Colombian case, for example, the court held that
because “the Nation [is] is the primary constituency which takes on a
sovereign character, . . . it cannot have any limits other than those it imposes on itself, nor can the constituted powers revise its acts.”16 In other
words, the constituent power acts outside of all existing legal principles
or restraints.17 The Venezuelan court took on the same view in 1999,
when it held that the constituent assembly convoked by Chavez was a
supraconstitutional body that had the power to dissolve or reorganize all
of the existing branches of government while it worked to write a new

14. The Honduran example, discussed below in Part III, is an example of this route—Zelaya
attempted to move forward with a non-binding vote on whether to hold a constituent assembly
despite judicial decisions to the contrary.
15. RAFAEL BALLÉN M., CONSTITUYENTE Y CONSTITUCIÓN DEL 91, at 169 (1991) (giving the
full text of the decision).
16. See id. at 170–71.
17. The Pakistan Supreme Court, in the case Syed Zafar Ali Shah v. General Pervez Musharraf, Chief Executive of Pakistan, (2000) 52 PLD (SC) 869, attempted an ex post halfway house
between legitimating the coup of President Musharraf and restraining it. It thus legitimated the coup
on grounds of public necessity while stating that the regime had to follow the existing constitution
and was barred from altering its fundamental principles. Such approaches, however, are rare in
constitutional theory, and even rarer when dealing with bodies like constituent assemblies.
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constitution.18 As often conceived, domestic law has nothing to say about
these moments.
B. International Law
International law has traditionally held a state’s form of government
to be irrelevant. Historically, this was because international law was concerned with relations between states rather than with the relationship
between a state and its own citizens.19 But even as international law has
built up a formidable body of law governing human rights, which prevents a state from taking certain kinds of actions against its own citizens,
the rule that international law is unconcerned with the internal governance of a state has persisted. For example, in Nicaragua v. United States,
the International Court of Justice held that the United States’ claim that
the Nicaraguan government was attempting to impose a “totalitarian”
form of government was irrelevant: “Every State possesses a fundamental right to choose and implement its own political, economic and social
systems.”20
Changes in international law have been slow and subtle. Some
scholars have argued that there is an emerging customary international
law norm of democracy.21 But this requires consistent state practice coupled with an opinion by states that they are following that practice because it constitutes binding international law (opinio juris). Given the
variation in types of governance that still exists around the world, and
pronouncements like the statement by the Nicaragua court, such a customary norm seems doubtful.22

18. See 77–80 REVISTA DEL DERECHO PUBLICO 111 (1999); see also ALLAN R. BREWERCARÍAS, DISMANTLING DEMOCRACY IN VENEZUELA: THE CHÁVEZ AUTHORITARIAN EXPERIMENT
58–60 (2010) (discussing this case and its implications); Joel I. Colón-Ríos, Carl Schmitt and Constituent Power in Latin American Courts The Cases of Venezuela and Colombia, 18
CONSTELLATIONS 365, 369–72 (2011) (discussing the Venezuelan case as a way to use the idea of
“constituent power” to get around legal constraints).
19. See, e.g., J.L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF PEACE 1 (4th ed. 1949) (defining international law as “the body of rules
and principles of action which are binding upon civilized nations in their relations with one another”).
20. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. 14, *131
(1986); see also Fernando R. Teson, Le Peuple, C'est Moi! The World Court and Human Rights, 81
AM. J. INT’L L. 173, 177–78 (1987) (criticizing ruling on grounds that the form of government, at
least in extreme cases, is deeply relevant to the enjoyment of human rights in a given country and
stating that “if the political system described as ‘totalitarian dictatorship’ results in a consistent
pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights, then that system cannot validly be ‘chosen’ by a state”).
21. See, e.g., Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J.
INT’L L. 46, 46 (1992).
22. I recognize that there are resolutions by both the U.N. Human Rights Commission and the
U.N. General Assembly affirming or suggesting that democracy is a human right. See, e.g., Commission on Human Rights Res. 1999/57, Commission on Human Rights, 57th Sess., Apr. 27, 1999, U.N.
CHR E/CN.4/RES/1999/57; G.A. Res. 55/2, pt. 5, U.N. Doc. A/55/L.2 (Sept. 8, 2000). However, as
with most of the other instruments studied in this section, the Human Rights Commission and General Assembly Resolutions do not constitute a form of binding international law.
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At most, there are now some norms within regional treaties that
bear on or protect the existence of international democracy; there appear
to be no norms at the global level. And most of these norms are nonbinding forms of soft law. For example, the Commonwealth nations associated with the British crown have signed multiple declarations expressing a commitment to democratic governance.23 The Treaty on European Union in its current incarnation states democracy as a basic principle of the Union and states that adherence to the essential principles
should be a core criterion for admission.24 Finally, the Inter-American
Democratic Charter (which does not enjoy the formal status of a treaty)
explicitly states a “right to democracy,” and the preamble states that “cooperation between American states requires the political organization of
those states based on the effective exercise of representative democracy.”25 The agreement also creates certain instruments that would aid the
Organization of American States (OAS) in assessing and responding to
breakdowns in democracy.26 These are all important regional pronouncements, but none of them really represent binding international
norms—they are all effectively forms of international soft law.27
Perhaps more interesting are those few instances where guarantees
of democratic governance, along with enforcement mechanisms, have
been incorporated into regional treaty regimes. In both the Latin American and African cases, the emphasis is on avoiding coups or other interruptions of democratic governments. Little attention is paid to other
problems, such as reconstituting states after interruptions or avoiding
erosions in democracy from overreaching presidents or other figures.
They therefore preserve international law’s traditional focus on order
within the international community, without expanding the focus to look
more broadly at democratic governance. The Charter of the OAS states
that “[a] member of the Organization whose democratically constituted
government has been overthrown by force may be suspended” by the
23. See, e.g., Heads of Gov’t in Harare, Zim., Harare Commonwealth Declaration, THE
COMMON WEALTH (Oct. 20, 1991), http://www.thecommonwealth.org/shared_asp_files/
GFSR.asp?NodeID=141095 (reaffirming a commitment to “democracy, democratic processes and
institutions”).
24. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union art. 2, Sept. 5, 2008, 2008 O.J.
(C 115) 13 (stating democracy as a basic value); id. art. 49 (requiring that states “respect[] the values” referred to in article 2 to become members of the Union), available at http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2008:115:0013:0045:EN:PDF.
25. Inter-American Democratic Charter, ORG. OF AM. STATES (Sept. 11, 2001) pmbl., art. 1,
http://www.oas.org/charter/docs/resolution1_en_p4.htm.
26. The Charter allows a state to request the support of the Secretary General of the OAS
whenever the democratic institutional order may be at risk. See id., arts. 17–18. It also provides that
the OAS should immediately use diplomatic means to repair an “unconstitutional interruption” of
democracy or a “unconstitutional alteration of the constitutional regime” that significantly impairs
democracy in a country. See id., arts. 20–21. If these efforts fail, the OAS is empowered to suspend
the violating state by a two-thirds vote. See id., art. 21.
27. International soft law is not binding on states or individuals, although it often has considerable persuasive or other significance. See, e.g., Hartmut Hillgenberg, A Fresh Look at Soft Law, 10
EUR. J. INT’L L. 499, 499 (1999).
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OAS.28 Somewhat similarly, the Constitutive Act of the African Union
provides that “[g]overnments which shall come to power through unconstitutional means shall not be allowed to participate in the activities of
the Union.”29 Both of these are essentially anti-coup clauses; they prohibit the unconstitutional replacement of one democratic regime by another,
but they say nothing about post-revolutionary circumstances where a
new democracy is being constituted, or about situations where an incumbent leader is taking steps to weaken democracy.
This kind of a focus—on dramatic interruptions like coups rather
than on other types of events that threaten democratic governance in subtle but important ways—is confirmed by looking at the way in which
these instruments have been carried out, and more broadly on how the
international community responds to different kinds of threats to democracy. The suspension mechanisms in the OAS and African Union are
sometimes invoked in response to unconstitutional overthrows of democratic governance, as occurred in Honduras after President Zelaya was
removed in 2009,30 and in Cote d’Ivoire, where President Bedie was
overthrown by a military coup in 1999.31 But where Hugo Chavez in
Venezuela used his lawfully elected position to undermine other democratic institutions by, for example, closing and intimidating hostile media
and weakening and packing the country’s Congress, Supreme Court, and
control institutions like the Ombudsman, the response of the OAS was
much more tepid. The organization has done virtually nothing, because
in the absence of an unconstitutional interruption in democracy that
might trigger the suspension clause, it is able to monitor and facilitate
dialogue only at the invitation of the Venezuelan state.32
Even if international organizations wanted to intervene, it is unclear
whether and how they could do so. As noted by Franck and
Thiruvengadam, there is “no firm evidence of rules applicable to the process of constitution making” within international law.33 While the authors try to leverage both the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and recent practice as a source for emerging legal norms, the
most that can be found is a general set of principles about public partici28. Protocol of Amendments to the Charter of the Organization of American States (A-56),
ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, WASHINGTON D.C. (Dec. 14, 1992),
http://www.oas.org/dil/treaties_A-56_Protocol_of_Washington.htm.
29. CONSTITUTIVE ACT OF THE AFRICAN UNION July 11, 2000, art. 30, available at
http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/aboutau/constitutive_act_en.htm.
30. See discussion infra Part III.
31. See Theodore J. Piccone, International Mechanisms for Protecting Democracy, in
PROTECTING DEMOCRACY: INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES 101, 119 (Morton H. Halperin & Mirna
Galic eds., 2005) (discussing the Bedie case).
32. See id. at 107 (discussing the ineffectiveness of the OAS’s attempted responses to
Chavez); see also supra note 26 (explaining the mechanisms created by the Inter-American Democratic Charter to protect democracy).
33. Thomas M. Franck & Arun K. Thiruvengadam, Norms of International Law Relating to
the Constitution-Making Process, in FRAMING THE STATE IN TIMES OF TRANSITION: CASE STUDIES
IN CONSTITUTION MAKING 3, 14 (Laurel E. Miller ed., 2010).
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pation in constitution-making processes.34 This is probably too vague a
principle to be much good at restraining the risks posed by constitutionmaking that are outlined in Parts III and IV below.35
More broadly, the international community often responds far more
forcefully and readily to regime changes than it does to the complex but
more important series of events occurring after the regime change. Egypt
and Libya offer recent examples: the attention of world media and world
governments was fixated in winter and early spring 2011 on the fall of
the Mubarak regime, and again in late spring and summer of 2011 on the
attempts of the rebels to dislodge Quaddafi with NATO support. But the
questions surrounding the subsequent construction of democratic governance in Egypt have received far less attention. There is little doubt
that the new Libyan leaders will be in a similar position. The example of
Honduras leading up to and following the 2009 removal of President
Zelaya, which I lay out in the next section, offers similar examples.
III. HONDURAS AS AN EXAMPLE OF THE SILENCE IN ACTION
In this section, I explain how Honduras offers an example of the
gaps in domestic and international law that I laid out in Part II. The point
is no longer that international law is wholly unresponsive to questions of
form of government. The point is that that response was focused only on
a narrow swath of issues. The OAS and other international actors responded vigorously to the illegal overthrow of President Zelaya in
2009.36 However, there was virtually no international reaction to the various illegal actions taken by President Zelaya before the overthrow,
which could have damaged the institutional framework of Honduran
democracy. Nor is there currently any attention paid to the new government’s movement towards rewriting the entire Honduran Constitution.
Moreover, this section supports my argument that changes in government are complex, multi-stage events, and that it is critical to expand
the focus beyond the moment in which an old regime is brought down.
The Honduran example is much closer to a coup than a revolution; but
34. The authors use article 1 of the ICCPR, which creates a right to “self-determination,” and
article 25, which gives a right “to take part in the conduct of public affairs.” See id. at 5–6.
35. I do not mean to imply that the international community is always uninvolved in constitution-making processes. Various post-conflict constitutions have been drafted with a high degree of
United Nations involvement—one can think of East Timor, Afghanistan, and Kosovo, for example.
See, e.g., Vijayashri Sripati, The United Nation’s Role in Post-Conflict Constitution-Making Processes TWAIL Insights, 10 INT’L COMMUNITY L. REV. 411, 415 (2008). But these tend to occur in
situations where the domestic state has been destroyed and domestic institutions and social groups
gravely weakened. In such instances, the international community essentially substitutes for domestic institutions in constructing the new constitutional order, and it acts according to sets of best
practices that it has developed rather than according to clear legal rules.
36. Most importantly, they quickly suspended Honduras from the Organization. See, e.g.,
Ginger Thompson & Marc Lacey, O.A.S. Votes to Suspend Honduras Over Coup, N.Y. TIMES, July
5,
2009,
at
A6,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/05/world/americas/
05honduras.html?pagewanted=all.
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even though the events simply changed the identity of the ruler rather
than thoroughly altering politics and society, the most important events
may be occurring after the coup rather than during the coup itself. The
actual change in regime in 2009—the irregular overthrow of President
Zelaya—was an important event in Honduran politics and society, but it
occurred in the middle of a much longer chain of events. Prior to the
removal, Zelaya himself engaged in a series of events that were calculated to weaken Honduran democracy.37 And the new regime has strongly
suggested that it will seek to engage in either a significant constitutional
reform or the writing of a new constitution.38 How this constitutional
reform process is carried out will go a long way towards determining
whether Honduran democracy will be strengthened or gravely weakened
in the longer run.
The analysis in this section is based heavily on work that I undertook, as part of a team including Noah Feldman, Brian Sheppard, and
Leonidas Rosa-Suazo, to analyze constitutional issues surrounding the
removal of Zelaya for the Commission on Truth and Reconciliation of
Honduras. Our task was both to analyze the constitutionality of the actions of both Zelaya and those removing him, and to make prospective
suggestions for constitutional reforms in order to prevent a recurrence
and to strengthen Honduran democracy.39
Our essential finding was that both sides acted unconstitutionally at
various key points. Zelaya won election in a political environment that is
notoriously closed and exclusionary.40 The political system is controlled
by the two traditional parties, the Liberal and National parties. Moreover,
these parties themselves are controlled by a small collection of largely
homogenous elites that also control most of the economic power in the
country.41 Zelaya, who himself is part of this group, won election as an
orthodox liberal, but began taking positions of a more “populist” variety
that were at variance with the leadership of his own party. From a foreign
policy perspective, he began aligning himself with Hugo Chavez, signing
several agreements, for example, to receive subsidized petroleum and
other kinds of aid.42 From a domestic perspective, he adopted a vague

37. See infra text accompanying notes 40–49.
38. See infra text accompanying notes 78–80.
39. The full text of this report is available in both English and Spanish. See Noah Feldman,
David Landau, Brian Sheppard & Leonidas Rosa Suazo, Report to the Commission on Truth and
Reconciliation of Honduras Constitutional Issues (Fla. State Coll. of Law, Pub. Law, Research
Paper No. 536, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1915214.
40. See Michelle M. Taylor, When Electoral and Party Institutions Interact to Produce Caudillo Politics The Case of Honduras, 15 ELECTORAL STUD. 327, 328–29 (1996) (providing a useful
overview of the basic nature and history of Honduran politics).
41. See id. at 331–32.
42. See, e.g., Central America Zelaya Plays the Chávez Card, ECONOMIST, Oct. 30, 2008,
available at http://www.economist.com/node/12522958?story_id=12522958.
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discourse and policy in favor of participation by a broader set of actors.43
He also began issuing increasingly strident attacks against the other institutions of the Honduran government, including the Congress and the
Supreme Court.44
Zelaya’s rhetoric aimed to delegitimize traditional political actors
and to gain political support from a broader range of traditionally marginalized political groups. His root goal appeared to be the strengthening
of his personal political power. He began signaling in late 2008 that he
would seek to call a constitutional convention to write an entirely new
constitutional text, replacing the current constitution of 1982.45 While
Zelaya never stated that he intended to reform the constitutional article
prohibiting presidential reelection, and indeed stated that he intended to
hold only one term in power, the widely held assumption was that he
would use the convention to extend his own term.46
This effort was complicated by two features of the Honduran Constitution. First, Article 373 establishes only one method for constitutional
reform: approval by two-thirds of Congress in two different congressional sessions.47 It says nothing about the legality of a constituent assembly.
Second, Article 374 establishes that certain provisions, including the
prohibition on presidential reelection, cannot be reformed under any circumstances.48 Article 239 enforces the prohibition on reelection by mandating that anyone who “breaks the prohibition or proposes its reform,
along with those who support [that effort] directly or indirectly” will

43. For example, one of President Zelaya’s first acts as president was to sign a new “Law of
Citizen’s Participation.” See Ley No. 30,917, 27 Jan. 2006, Ley de Participacion Ciudadana [Law of
Citizen’s Participation] Decreto 3-2006, LA GACETA, DIARIO OFICIAL [L.G.], 1 Feb. 2006 (Hond.),
http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Parties/Honduras/Leyes/LeyParticipacion.pdf (stating that “sovereignty
belongs to the people, from which emanates the powers of the State,” and therefore that the government is based on “the principle of participatory democracy).
44. For example, Zelaya failed to present a 2009 budget to Congress by the constitutional
deadline of September 15, 2008, and thus no budget was passed for that year. The Congress and
Supreme Court both claimed that they received no budgetary allocations in 2009, up until the point
when Zelaya was removed from power. See Presupuesto 2009 no llega al Congreso Nacional [2009
Budget Does Not Come to Congress], LA PRENSA (Hond.) (Feb. 5, 2009, 11:02PM),
http://archivo.laprensa.hn/Pa%c3%ads/Ediciones/2009/02/06/Noticias/Presupuesto-2009-no-llegaal-Congreso-Nacional.
45. See Manuel Zelaya propone asamblea constituyente [Manuel Zelaya Proposed Constituent
Assembly],
EL
HERALDO
(Hond.)
(Nov.
22,
2008,
11:15AM),
http://www.heraldohn.com/index.php/content/view/full/46876.
46. See id.; see also Buscan crear vacío de poder en Honduras [Seek to Create a Power
Vacuum
in
Honduras],
EL HERALDO
(Hond.)
(Jan.
16,
2009,
10:20PM),
http://eng.elheraldo.hn/content/view/full/69737 (describing the view of other political actors who
believed Zelaya would attempt to perpetuate himself in power).
47. See CONSTITUCION POLITICA DE LA REPUBLICA DE HONDURAS [CN.] tit. VII, ch. I, art.
373, 11 Jan. 1982, as interpreted by Decreto No. 169/1986.
48. See id. art. 374 (rendering unamendable, inter alia, provisions dealing with the form of
government, the national territory, the length of the presidential term, and the prohibition on being
reelected president).
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cease immediately in her office and be ineligible to serve any public
function for ten years.49
At any rate, Zelaya pressed forward with his plans for the constituent assembly, issuing several decrees ordering the carrying out of a nationwide “consultation” or “poll” on June 28, 2009, to see whether the
public supported the effort.50 The decrees stated that the consultation
would be non-binding and would be used as political support for
Zelaya’s project.51 An administrative court in May 2009 blocked the first
decree, and the court’s order was not successfully appealed. Zelaya then
essentially issued the same order under a slightly different name, and the
court issued a “clarification” to its order to cover the new decree.52 Nonetheless, Zelaya pressed forward with his plans. Allegedly, the Supreme
Court opened a criminal investigation of the president on various
grounds (including treason and abuse of authority) on June 26, 2009, and
issued an arrest warrant, to be carried out by military officials, on June
27. The military arrived at Zelaya’s house on the morning of June 28
and, instead of taking him to the country’s Supreme Court as allegedly
specified in the warrant, took him on a plane and carried him to Costa
Rica.53 Later that day, the Congress purported to “separate” Zelaya from
the office of president and to appoint the president of the Congress (Roberto Micheleti) as interim president. The Congress took this action even
though it lacked any explicit presidential impeachment or removal power.54
The public debate in Honduras about the legality of Zelaya’s actions
centered largely on whether it was legally possible to hold a constituent
assembly to write an entirely new constitution, including the prohibition
on presidential reelection.55 Those are very difficult questions to answer
49. See id. ch. VI, art. 239, 11 Jan. 1982, as amended by Decreto No. 374/2002 and ratified by
Decreto No. 153/2003. (“[W]hosoever breaks this disposition or proposes its reform, as well as those
who directly or indirectly support him, shall immediately cease in the exercise of their office and
will be disqualified from the exercise of any public function for ten (10) years.”)
50. See Decreto No. PCM-005-2009 (Hond.) (ordering a “public consultation” managed by
the National Institute of Statistics); Decreto No. 31,945, PCM-020-2009, LA GACETA DIARIO
OFICIAL [L.G.], 25 June 2008 (Hond.) (changing the name of the “public consultation” to a poll);
Acuerdo Ejecutivo No. 027-2009 (Hond.) (ordering the armed forces to provide “support” for the
“poll”).
51. See Decreto PCM-005-2009, art. 3 (Hond.) (“The positive result of this popular consultation will serve as a legitimate basis for the Executive to send to the National Congress a special legal
project to place the [issue] on the ballot in the general elections of November 2009.”).
52. See Decreto No. 31,945, PCM-020-2009, L.G., 25 June 2008 (Hond.) (changing the name
of the “consultation” to a “poll”).
53. See, e.g., Micheletti Sucede a “Mel” [Micheletti Happens to “Mel”], LA TRIBUNA
(Hond.)
(June
29,
2009),
http://www.latribuna.hn/2009/06/29/micheletti-sucede-a%E2%80%9Cmel%E2%80%9D/.
54. See, e.g., id.
55. See, e.g., Edmundo Orellana, Golpe de Estado en Honduras [Coup in Honduras],
VOSELOBERANO.COM
(Sept.
27,
2009),
available
at
http://voselsoberano.com/v1/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=856:golpe-deestado-en-honduras-un-analisis-juridico-por-edmundo-orellana&catid=17:debate-juridico (arguing
that a constituent assembly would be possible in the existing framework).
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from within an existing constitutional framework. Most constitutions are
silent about their own replacement by new texts. And even if a constitution had an explicit prohibition on constituent assemblies or on the writing of new texts, arguably the public retains an inherent and inalienable
power to rewrite their constitution.
Our analysis focused much more on serious problems in the constitution-making process. Regardless of whether Zelaya somehow could
have moved towards convoking a constituent assembly, he did not follow
procedures that were mandated by Honduran law and would have been
necessary to ensure the fairness of the process. First, Zelaya had no legal
authority to call for the vote, and he did not seek the Congress’s assent to
the passage of a new law that would have given him that authority.56
Even the consideration of the convoking of a constituent assembly is a
serious event better processed on the basis of consensus or near consensus. Zelaya instead set up his project in opposition to both the Congress
and the judiciary, as part of a general pattern of attacks against those
institutions.57
Moreover, while the constitution sets up a fairly well-functioning
Supreme Electoral Tribunal as the institution charged with supervising
elections,58 Zelaya instead placed his “consultation” or “poll” under the
charge of a National Institute of Statistics, which is basically the Honduran equivalent of the census bureau.59 The Electoral Tribunal has the
capacity and experience to monitor polling places and ensure the overall
fairness of an election; the National Institute of Statistics had none of
these capabilities. Finally, and even more troublingly, Zelaya ordered the
military to “support” the “poll,” basically using the specter of military
force as a cudgel against those groups who opposed the effort.60The military ordinarily provides logistical support during elections, but under the
authority and orders of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal; Zelaya instead
invoked his direct authority as chief of the armed forces.61

56. Zelaya attempted to use the Law of Citizen Participation as support for his action, see
supra note 46, but it was clear that that law did not give him the power to carry out a nationwide
vote, even if non-binding.
57. See supra note 44.
58. See CONSTITUCION POLITICA DE LA REPUBLICA DE HONDURAS [CN.] ch. V, art. 51, 11
Jan. 1982, as amended by Decreto No. 154/2003 (creating a Supreme Electoral Tribunal charged
with “everything related with electoral acts and procedures”).
59. See Decreto No. PCM-005-2009 (Hond.); Decreto No. 31,945, PCM-020-2009, L.G., 25
June 2009 (Hond.) (both providing that the National Institute of Statistics would “supervise the
effective execution” of the consultation or poll).
60. See Acuerdo Ejecutivo No. 027-2009 (Hond.).
61. See CONSTITUCION POLITICA DE LA REPUBLICA DE HONDURAS [CN.] ch. X, art. 272, 11
Jan. 1982, as amended by Decreto No. 245/1998 and ratified by Decreto No. 2/1999 (ordering the
president to place the military at the disposition of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal one month before
all elections).
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In short, we regarded the question of whether Zelaya could legally
have moved towards a constituent assembly as relatively unimportant.62
It was far more relevant that the particular process he had chosen lacked
legitimacy. He moved forward without ensuring that any sort of consensus or near consensus existed. And his choice of institutions—the National Institute of Statistics and military—to support the vote would not
have provided any guarantee of fairness in outcome.
We were also struck by the nature of the international reaction surrounding the incident. The condemnation by almost all countries and by
the OAS of the illegal removal of President Zelaya by the military and
congress was proper. For example, the OAS condemned the incident as a
“coup d’etat” and suspended Honduras under its democracy clauses,63
while the Obama Administration also sharply condemned the removal as
“illegal” and demanded the restoration of Zelaya.64 There was a constitutional procedure to remove Zelaya—trial before the Supreme Court—but
the actors opposed to Zelaya did not follow that process. In so doing,
they raised the specter, which had long plagued democratic governance
in the region, of military intervention in politics. International organizations and other states rightly condemned the actions of those opposed to
Zelaya.
But there was little condemnation of Zelaya’s actions prior to his
removal. And it is critical to see that these actions too raised the specter
of a serious threat to democratic governance: the threat that a strong-man
president will use his power to undermine other institutions of government and essentially erode democracy from within. This is no mere fantasy, and in fact has been far more common in recent times in Latin
America than direct military intervention in politics.65 Following
Levitsky and Way’s argument, pro-democracy norms have now become
sufficiently entrenched that obviously anti-democratic action like mili-

62. There are plenty of examples of new constitutions being written outside of the structure of
existing constitutional law, but in ways that clearly produce highly legitimate texts. Colombia in
1991, for example, convoked a constituent assembly and wrote an entirely new constitution to replace the Constitution of 1886, even though the Constitution (as in Honduras) only gave the Congress the power to amend the constitutional text. Yet the constitution-making process has produced a
highly legitimate text. See supra text accompanying notes 59–62.
63. See OAS Suspends Membership of Honduras, ORG. OF AM. STATES (July 5, 2009),
http://www.oas.org/en/media_center/press_release.asp?sCodigo=E-219/09.
64. See, e.g., PETER J. MEYER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34027, HONDURAN-U.S.
RELATIONS 14 (2009), available at http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/128853.pdf; see also
Noah Feldman, David Landau & Brian Sheppard, Op-Ed., Fixing Honduras, L.A. TIMES, June 7,
2011, at 11, available at http://articles.latimes.com/print/2011/jun/07/opinion/la-oe-landauhonduras-20110607 (noting the significant “real-world effects,” like loss of foreign aid, of the international steps taken against Honduras).
65. Aside from the Honduran case, Hugo Chavez in Venezuela, Alberto Fujimori in Peru, Evo
Morales in Bolivia, Rafael Correa in Ecuador, and Alvaro Uribe in Colombia have all arguably
attempted similar erosions of democratic governance. See, e.g., Scott Mainwaring, The Crisis of
Representation in the Andes, in LATIN AMERICA’S STRUGGLE FOR DEMOCRACY 18, 18–19 (Larry
Diamond, Marc F. Plattner & Diego Abente Brun eds., 2008).
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tary coups has become disfavored.66 But subtler attacks on the democratic institutions that provide “horizontal accountability” to presidents, like
congresses and courts, may be more acceptable.67 At the very least, the
president can use the mantle of “popular legitimacy,” arguing that he is
carrying out the people’s will while other institutions are frustrating it.
Zelaya repeatedly relied on that sort of rhetoric.68 Chavez in Venezuela
and Fujimori in Peru provide clear examples of this threat—each undertook serious manipulation of legislatures and courts to attain maximal
power.69 Correa in Ecuador, Morales in Bolivia, and Uribe in Colombia
have all provided more but still troubling cases of the same trend.70 Internal erosion of democracy, rather than the military coup, is now the
major threat to democracy in Latin America and perhaps in most of the
world.
Yet the United States merely observed blandly that Zelaya’s referendum was an internal matter and requested that the relevant parties
come to a “consensual democratic resolution.”71 The OAS, however,
played a more pernicious role. The OAS Secretary-General agreed, at
Zelaya’s request, to send a mission to observe Zelaya’s “poll” or “consultation.”72 The Secretary-General stated that due to the “nature” of the
vote, this mission would be a “mission of accompaniment,” rather than
the standard “electoral mission” that would observe an election and that
is explicitly mentioned in the Inter-American Democratic Charter.73 Regardless of the formal name for the mission, the Secretary-General’s
action served as a form of legitimization for Zelaya’s “consultation.”
Some commentators have suggested that politics played a role in the
Secretary-General actions, noting his closeness to Chavez and other Latin America leaders within his sphere of influence.74 But the ideological
structure of international law and politics also played an important role:
66. See LEVITSKY & WAY, supra note 1, at 43–54.
67. In Guillermo O’Donnell’s model of delegative democracy, popular presidents use their
link to the public in order to weaken other institutions that might serve as checks on their power. See
Guillermo O’Donnell, Delegative Democracy, 5 J. DEMOCRACY 55, 59–62 (1994); see also Guillermo O’Donnell, Horizontal Accountability in New Democracies, in THE SELF-RESTRAINING STATE:
POWER AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN NEW DEMOCRACIES 29, 29 (Andreas Schedler et al. eds., 1999)
(arguing that many developing countries in Latin America and elsewhere are plagued by the “absence” of horizontal accountability).
68. See supra text accompanying note 47.
69. See Mainwaring, supra note 65, at 22–24.
70. See, e.g., Mitchell A. Seligson, The Rise of Populism and the Left, in LATIN AMERICA’S
STRUGGLE FOR DEMOCRACY, supra note 65, at 77, 77.
71. See MEYER, supra note 66, at 14.
72. See OEA Analiza Enviar Misión a Honduras El Organismo Internacional Tendrá un
Enviado Especial para Mediar en el Problema, EL HERALDO (Hond.), June 26, 2009,
http://www.elheraldo.hn/Al%20Frente/Ediciones/2009/06/26/Noticias/OEA-analiza-enviar-misiona-Honduras.
73. See id.; see also Inter-American Democratic Charter, ORG. OF AM. STATES (Sept. 11,
2001) arts. 23–25, http://www.oas.org/charter/docs/resolution1_en_p4.htm.
74. See generally The Facts and the Law Behind the Democratic Crisis in Honduras, 2009 A
Constitutional and International Democracy Law Analysis, HUMAN RIGHTS FOUND. (Mar. 8, 2010),
http://thehrf.org/HRF_TheFactsAndTheLaw_Honduras2009.pdf.
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the ire of the OAS and the international community was properly and
forcefully invoked against the removal of Zelaya. And the OAS’s clear
provisions against “interruptions” of democratic governments were used
to suspend the new Honduran regime. But the international community
lacked a set of conceptual or legal tools to respond to Zelaya’s attempts
to undermine the other institutions in his own democracy.
The aftermath of the removal offers similar lessons. After new elections were held in November 2009, and the interim president, Micheleti,
was replaced by a new permanent president from the National Party,
Porfirio Lobo, the reaction of the international community began to soften. The State Department in the United States “noted that it recognized
the complicated nature of events” in Honduras.75 Moreover, Zelaya and
the regime reached a set of agreements that granted him legal immunity
for actions taken during the crisis and allowed him to return to the country. And in June 2011, the OAS lifted the suspension of Honduras from
the organization by an overwhelming vote of thirty-two in favor and only
one (Ecuador) against.76 The message of the international community
was that the intervening events in the country—both electoral politics
and the accord between Zelaya and the regime—had cleansed the damage done by the removal of Zelaya. Thus, normalcy had been restored,
and Honduran politics once again became a wholly domestic affair.
The problem is that politics in the country had not really been restored to normal. There were documented human rights abuses against
Zelaya’s supporters in the aftermath of his removal, and the election of
Lobo in November 2009, while untainted by fraud, was also not conducted in a fully open environment.77 Moreover, the Honduran state had
suffered a deep crisis of legitimacy; such a crisis cannot be healed in a
short period of time. In this social and political context, there have been
recurring calls for a new overhaul of the Constitution. Some constitutional articles have already been reformed—for example Article 5, which
regulates plebiscites and referenda, has been broadened to make these
devices easier to use and to possibly allow for sweeping constitutional
reforms via some sort of direct democracy.78 The current presidential
administration has suggested that it favors these reforms, and the common understanding is that its emphasis is on doing exactly what Zelaya

75. See Feldman, Landau & Sheppard, supra note 64 (internal quotation marks omitted).
76. See OAS Lifts Honduras Suspension After Zelaya Agreement, BBC NEWS, June 1, 2011,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-13622939.
77. See, e.g., INTER-AM. COMM’N HUMAN RIGHTS, ORG. OF AM. STATES, HONDURAS:
HUMAN
RIGHTS
AND
THE
COUP
D’ETAT
59–62
(2009),
available
at
http://www.cidh.org/pdf%20files/HONDURAS2009ENG.pdf (documenting both human rights
abuses and problems in November 2009 election).
78. See CN Aprobó Reformas a la Constitución de Honduras, EL HERALDO (Hond.), Jan. 12,
2011, http://www.elheraldo.hn/Ediciones/2011/01/12/Noticias/CN-aprobo-reformas-a-Constitucionde-Honduras.
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was trying to do: change the constitution to allow for presidential reelection.79
This overhaul is not particularly popular with the public: a recent
poll showed that just less than half of the population favored significant
reforms.80 In the wake of the serious trauma faced by the Honduran democracy, such a result is, at first blush, surprising. But I think it is explained by the way in which these reforms have been framed: it is obvious to citizens that the push for constitutional reforms has occurred because of specific, short-term political agendas. As with Zelaya, it appears
that the discourse about popular legitimacy, increased participation, and
constitutional politics is a cover for the continuation of the power games
that have always been played between the small Honduran elite.
IV. THE PROMISE AND PERIL OF CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS
The Honduran example highlights the main risk of constitutionmaking: that momentarily powerful actors or groups will use the constitution-making process to remake the state in order to serve their own
interests. Typically, they use claims to majoritarian support (whether true
or false), and tools such as plebiscites and referenda, in order to make an
end-run around existing democratic institutions.
Recent work by Partlett demonstrates this risk in Eastern Europe.
Partlett draws heavily on the example of Russia, where Yeltsin withdrew
the constitution-making process from Parliament and moved it to an appointed constituent assembly in order to take more control over the process. In other words, in Russia the invocation of a constitutional moment
was a ruse used by the president, and the resulting constitution has
lacked legitimacy and has failed to constrain strong-man Russian executives.81
In Latin America, constitution-making in Venezuela, Ecuador, and
Bolivia, along with the Honduran example explored above, demonstrates
the same risk to varying degrees.82 Venezuela is perhaps the classic example. Hugo Chavez, who had formerly led a failed coup attempt against
the political system in 1992,83 won the presidential election in 1998 with
79. See, e.g., Lobo Consultará a Sectores Sobre Posible Reforma Constitucional en Honduras, LA NACIÓN (Costa Rica), June 29, 2011, http://www.nacion.com/2011-06-29/Mundo/Loboconsultara-a-sectores-sobre-posible-reforma-constitucional-en-Honduras.aspx.
80. See id.
81. See William Partlett, Making Constitutions Matter The Dangers of Constitutional Politics
in Current Post-Authoritarian Constitution Making, 38 BROOK. J. INT’L L. (forthcoming 2012),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1924958 (looking also at examples
in Belarus and Kazakhstan).
82. For a fuller exploration of the Venezuelan and Bolivian examples, see Landau, supra note
5.
83. See Felipe Agüero, Crisis and Decay of Democracy in Venezuela The Civil-Military
Dimension, in VENEZUELAN DEMOCRACY UNDER STRESS 215, 215–16 (Jennifer McCoy et al. eds.,
1995) (recounting the coup attempt).
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56% of the vote. Chavez arrived at a perilous moment for the democracy—the country’s once very-strong two traditional parties had lost legitimacy because of successive corruption scandals and because they
seemed out of touch with citizens.84 Chavez thus won election as an antisystem outsider. Chavez campaigned on a promise to hold a constituent
assembly, and once elected moved forward with plans to call a constituent assembly and remake the democracy. He promised to abolish Venezuela’s traditional system, which was dominated by two traditional parties, and to create a more inclusive, socially transformative democracy.85
While Chavez was fairly popular in Venezuela, the rules for composing the constituent assembly manufactured total dominance by proChavez forces and marginalized all of the opposition.86 Rather than using
pure proportional representation as in Colombia, Venezuela used an electoral system based on either single-member districts or small regional
districts electing a small number of delegates.87 This resulted in the massive overrepresentation of pro-Chavez forces. While Chavez had won
election in 1998 with only 56% of the vote, and while his forces only
won 65% of the vote in the Assembly, he won 93% of the seats in the
Assembly and was able to achieve exactly the constitution he envisioned.
The tiny opposition had no power to block or alter any of Chavez’s proposals.88
The resulting process strengthened Chavez’s powers and wiped
away many of the existing checks on the president. First, the constituent
assembly replaced the members of most of the other institutions of state
(including the Supreme Court, National Electoral Council, Congress, and
state legislative assemblies).89 It used its “constituent powers” to take
these actions, which were upheld by the supreme court on the grounds
that the constituent assembly was not bound by the legal constraints of
either the existing or new constitutional order.90 The Assembly also
drafted a constitution that suited Chavez by allowing for a very strong
chief executive. Indeed, the 1999 Venezuelan Constitution has been
84. See Michael Coppedge, Partidocracia and Reform in Comparative Perspective, in
VENEZUELAN DEMOCRACY UNDER STRESS, supra note 83, at 173, 174, 187–90 (explaining the
decline of the party system).
85. See Renata Segura & Ana María Bejarano, ¡Ni una Asamblea Más sin Nosotros! Exclusion, Inclusion, and the Politics of Constitution-Making in the Andes, 11 CONSTELLATIONS 217,
224–25 (2004).
86. The traditional parties also helped to marginalize themselves by boycotting the constituent
assembly. See id. at 225–28.
87. See id. at 230 (noting that the opposition received more than 34% of the vote but grabbed
only 4.6% of the seats).
88. For the view of one of the members of the opposition during the Assembly, see generally
BREWER-CARÍAS, supra note 18, at 35–68.
89. See Allan R. Brewer-Carías, The 1999 Venezuelan Constitution-Making Process as an
Instrument for Framing the Development of an Authoritarian Political Regime, in FRAMING THE
STATE IN TIMES OF TRANSITION: CASE STUDIES IN CONSTITUTION MAKING 505, 507 (Laurel E.
Miller ed., 2010).
90. See supra text accompanying note 18 (explaining this decision and its logic).
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called “[h]yperpresidential.”91 For example, it allowed presidential
reelection for the first time in many decades and lengthened the presidential term from five to six years.92 It also weakened other institutions, for
example by abolishing the Senate and by making the judiciary much
more dependent on the Congress than it had been previously.93 There can
be little doubt in the Venezuelan case that the constitution-making process is linked to the constitutional outcome, and it is not difficult to argue
that the Constitution undermined existing institutions and caused longrun harm to the quality of Venezuelan democracy.
If I am correct about the main peril of constitution-making, then this
suggests that the existing literature on the topic needs to be reframed.
The existing literature on constitution-making is dominated by Elster,
who argues that probably the core task of the constitution-making process is avoiding deliberation based on short-term interest.94 Delegates
must be forced to consider the long-term interest of the country rather
than their immediate short-term political goals. Thus, for example, constitutions should be drafted in special chambers like constitutional assemblies rather than in ordinary legislatures, and delegates should be
ineligible to run for office immediately after serving in the assembly.95
Yet if the main risk of constitution-making is instead the risk of
abuse by temporarily popular figures seeking to enhance their power,
then we will need a different set of design recommendations. Presentation of a model keyed to this risk is the topic of my current work and is
beyond the scope of the current project.96 But the main need is to find
rules and principles that will restrain the ability of powerful individual
figures, minorities, or temporary majorities from imposing their own
desired constitution.97 Given the current state of domestic constitutional
theory and international law, this will not be an easy task, but it is urgent.

91. See JAVIER CORRALES & MICHAEL PENFOLD, DRAGON IN THE
AND THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REVOLUTION IN VENEZUELA 16 (2011).

TROPICS: HUGO CHÁVEZ

92. See id. at 19
93. See id.
94. See Jon Elster, Forces and Mechanisms in the Constitution-Making Process, 45 DUKE L.J.
364, 394 (1995).
95. See id. at 395 (“The most important [implication] is perhaps that to reduce the scope for
institutional interest, constitutions ought to be written by specially convened assemblies and not by
bodies that also serve as ordinary legislatures.”).
96. A more complete theorization is developed in David Landau, Constitution-Making Gone
Wrong, 64 ALA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012).
97. Andrew Arato produces a very helpful analysis of constitution-making in Iraq; he argues
that the effort was hamstrung because the Occupation did not take seriously the need to allow participation from all affected groups. See ANDREW ARATO, CONSTITUTION MAKING UNDER
OCCUPATION: THE POLITICS OF IMPOSED REVOLUTION IN IRAQ 122–23, 255–56 (2009). In a provocative recent article, Partlett emphasizes the advantages of drafting constitutions in ordinary
political bodies like congresses rather than constituent assemblies or other extralegal processes like
extraordinary referenda. See PARTLETT, supra note 81, at 27–29. Whether drafting constitutions
using ordinary political institutions rather than extraordinary ones is an adequate check is a more
difficult issue. For example, both Congresses and Constituent Assemblies can be abused if they can
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In Egypt and in other countries with a swirl of emerging political
parties and civil society groups, this likely means that electoral rules
should be structured to try and deny any one faction (say the Islamicist
parties) a clear majority. In Honduras, Colombia, and other countries
with historically exclusionist political systems, it means that electoral
rules and other devices should be used to give representation to groups
that have historically been excluded from the political process. The exact
tools to achieve these goals will be highly context-specific. Proportional
representation rather than a majoritarian electoral system, for example,
should generally help to achieve greater representativeness and avoid the
overrepresentation of the most popular parties are groups.98 But while the
exclusion of current or even past politicians may be desirable in contexts
where the main problem has been the closed nature of the existing political system (as in Honduras and Colombia), it may be highly undesirable
in new democracies like Egypt, where there is a pressing need for political expertise and technical skill in the assembly.
The basic analysis—that processes must be structured so as to minimize the ability of individual groups to dominate—has other important
implications. In Egypt and in other situations experiencing a democratic
transition, civil society and political parties remain inchoate. Some
movements, in this case the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist
groups, were much more organized than other elements during the Mubarak regime. The domination of these movements in early elections may
reflect in part their organizational advantages rather than genuine popularity. In this context, the role of the military and judiciary in restraining
these forces becomes highly difficult to evaluate. As noted in Part II, the
military-backed judiciary has taken extreme measures, including dissolving the Parliament, in order to slow the electoral power of the Muslim
Brotherhood. Most domestic and international commentators have
viewed these measures as a “judicial coup” or as otherwise fundamentally undemocratic. But the reality may be more complex—as Ozan Varol
has recently argued, the military can actually play pro-democratic roles
during many democratic transitions.99 Further, as Sam Issacharoff suggests, fragile or unstable democracies may need illiberal institutions in
order to stave off implosion from within.100

be controlled by a single political group. Perhaps more important than the chamber where a constitution is written is the composition of that chamber and the rules under which it will make decisions.
98. See, e.g., AREND LIJPHART, ELECTORAL SYSTEMS AND PARTY SYSTEMS: A STUDY OF
TWENTY-SEVEN DEMOCRACIES 1945–1990, at 54–77 (1994) (showing how pure proportional representation tends to translate votes exactly into seats, while majoritarian systems overrepresent the
largest parties, sometimes massively).
99. Varol, supra note 4.
100. Samuel Issacharoff, Fragile Democracies, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1405 (2007) (arguing that
weak democracies may need to use party-banning and other techniques to ensure that antidemocratic elements cannot come to power through lawful means).
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V. CONCLUSIONS
Old regimes fall and new regimes rise in situations of great uncertainty. In these situations, constitution-making is likely to be a key event
in shaping the character of the new regime. The character of the Egyptian
and Libyan regimes, for example, is likely to be worked out largely as a
result of the battles fought and compromises struck as new constitutions
are written in each country. Yet constitution-making is a dangerous and
often socially-traumatic event. In a broad range of situations, we should
be most worried about constructing a robust model of constitutionmaking that seeks to avoid a breakdown of democracy.
But constructing such a model of constitution-making is quite difficult. As noted in Part III, domestic constitutional rules are often no help,
because ideologically there is a long tradition of seeing constitutionmaking as an event outside of the existing constitutional order. In the
classical view popularized by Sieyes, Schmitt, and Kelsen, revolutionary
legal change cannot, logically, be constrained by existing institutions.
Moreover, international law does nothing to fill this gap—it continues to
struggle to reach into the “black box” of domestic political change. Finally, there is a critical practical problem: those institutions capable of restraining undemocratic elements during transitions have often been
weakened by the transition process, and may be viewed as illegitimate.
Like the military in Egypt, they may have lost much of their capacity to
command respect, and may themselves have questionable pro-democratic
credentials.
In this context, the search for constraint on the constitution-making
process is a kind of triage. Even damaged and distrusted domestic institutions like the Egyptian military and judiciary may be useful in stabilizing
new regimes and in acting as a counterbalance to would-be hegemonic
political forces. A restricted democracy, with the military hemming in
electoral politics, may be a reasonable tradeoff against the possibility of a
democratic breakdown. International institutions could also play a
stronger role in backing up domestic institutions. As noted in Part II,
international law says little about democracy and even less about situations that are not coups or other ruptures in the institutional order. But at
the least, we can develop a set of principles to be used by the international community when evaluating the proposed constitutional assemblies in
Egypt and in other new or reconstituted democracies. In so doing, the
international community can help ensure the emergence of vibrant democracies.

